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This article reviews how Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ net interest income has evolved 
in recent years and explores the main underlying factors, which include the low levels of 
interest rates. For this purpose, three alternative breakdowns of net interest income are 
considered. The first shows how the volume of credit and the non-performing loan ratio have 
been as –or more– significant than net income per unit of assets in explaining the performance of 
net interest income since the start of the crisis. The second shows the historical importance 
for Spanish institutions of implicit income from payment services and its loss of significance in 
the current context of negative short-term market rates. The third illustrates how, since the 
onset of the crisis, there has been a rise in the yield spread between new lending and 
interbank rates, which may be partly due to the way in which institutions are responding to 
low interest rates.
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Three years after the Spanish economy began to recover, Spain’s deposit-taking institutions, 
like their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, are still registering relatively low levels of net 
interest income. This is partly due to the current atypical state of policy interest rates, which 
are extremely low, and even negative, in the euro area. This tends to depress net interest 
income, given the natural reluctance of retail customers to accept negative remuneration 
when they deposit their money with these institutions. Therefore, as short-term interest rates 
approach zero or even turn negative, deposit-taking institutions find it ever harder to reduce 
their borrowing costs further to compensate for declining returns on their assets, thus 
squeezing their net interest income (the difference between the money the institution receives 
for its assets and that which it pays for its liabilities). However, this is not the only –or 
necessarily the most important– factor explaining the current low level of interest income.
This article sets out to analyse the various factors that have affected how deposit-taking 
institutions’ net interest income from their business in Spain has performed in recent years, 
focusing, in particular, on discussing the implications of low interest rates. For this purpose, 
three alternative breakdowns of how net interest income has evolved are considered. The 
reason for focusing on operations in Spain is that the effect of the euro area’s current low 
interest rate environment on this business is clearest. By contrast, foreign operations are 
mostly located outside the euro area, and so driven by other factors. Moreover, as the 
majority of Spanish institutions do most of their business in Spain, any conclusions 
obtained are directly applicable to them..
The following three sections analyse three alternative breakdowns of net interest income. 
The first two refer to the total, while the third refers to interest margins on new business.
Net interest income is defined as the difference between the interest deposit-taking 
institutions receive on their financial assets and that which they pay on their liabilities. It is 
therefore affected by both the difference between the average return on assets and the 
average cost of borrowing (net interest margin), as well as by the volume of these assets 
and liabilities. Furthermore, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio also affects net interest 
income, as an asset’s being classed as such means that the interest is not being paid, so 
is not recorded as income on the profit and loss account. This section breaks down 
Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ net interest income in the recent past into three 
components: net interest margin, asset volume, and the NPL ratio.
Chart 1.1 shows how Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ net interest income from their 
domestic business has evolved, expressed in billions of euros.  As can be seen, there was 
an almost unbroken upward trend from 1987 to 2008, after which the trend was clearly 
downwards, albeit with some fluctuations. This second phase basically coincides with the 
period in which policy interest rates have been close to zero or negative, illustrated on the 
chart showing the three-month interbank deposit rates. Nevertheless, there is no clear-cut 
historical correlation between net interest income and short-term interest rates. For 
instance, the sharp fall in interest rates between 1992 and 1999 was not accompanied by 
a drop in net interest income, which highlights the importance of changes in the volume of 
assets (see Chart 1.2) and the NPL ratio.
Introduction
Non-performing loans, 
asset volume and margins
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NET INTEREST INCOME, ASSETS AND NPL RATIOS OF DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN SPAIN CHART 1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OBSERVED
ADJUSTED FOR NPLs
ADJUSTED FOR NPLs AND WEIGHT OF LENDING TO ORSs
6  NET INTEREST MARGIN
% of total assets
-3
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
NET INTEREST INCOME 3-MTH INTERBANK RATE (right-hand scale)
€bn
1  NET INTEREST INCOME AND SHORT-TERM RATES
%
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
MARGIN EFFECT VOLUME EFFECT NPL EFFECT
REMAINDER TOTAL
4  BREAKDOWN OF CHANGE IN NET INTEREST INCOME SINCE MARCH 2003
%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
AVERAGE LENDING RATE (a) AVERAGE YIELD ON LENDING TO ORSs (b)
 NPL RATIO (right-hand scale) (c)
3  LENDING INTEREST RATES AND NPL RATIO
%%
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
NET INTEREST INCOME TOTAL ASSETS (right-hand scale)
LENDING TO ORSs (right-hand scale)
€bn
2  NET INTEREST INCOME AND ASSETS
€bn
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
MARGIN EFFECT VOLUME EFFECT NPL EFFECT
REMAINDER TOTAL
5  BREAKDOWN OF CHANGE IN NET INTEREST INCOME SINCE
     DECEMBER 2007
%
SOURCES: Banco de España and own calculations.
a Interest rate (NDER) of outstanding balances of lending to households and non-financial corporations.
b Financial revenue from lending to ORSs divided by average balance.
c Ratio of NPLs to total lending to ORSs.
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For the purposes of the aforementioned breakdown, the impact of NPLs was first 
estimated. This can be inferred by comparing the average interest rate on all outstanding 
loans to households and non-financial corporations (obtained from the harmonised 
Eurosystem interest rate statistics) and the average return recorded on the profit and loss 
account as being obtained from lending to other resident sectors (ORSs),1 calculated as 
interest received divided by the average balance of lending. In the former case, the average 
rate on outstanding loans is reported, irrespective of whether current on payment or not, 
while in the latter, only interest effectively collected is registered. Consequently, the 
difference between them can basically be attributed to the effect of non-performing loans.2 
Indeed, as Chart 1.3 shows, the two series only started to diverge in 2008, as the NPL ratio 
on lending to ORSs began to rise as a result of the emerging crisis, such that the NPL ratio 
explains 97% of the difference over time. This close correlation makes it possible to 
estimate the returns on lending that deposit-taking institutions would have achieved had 
the NPL ratio remained constant. The difference between this ratio and that effectively 
obtained, multiplied by the volume of lending, gives an estimate of the impact of NPLs.
The volume effect is estimated here as the change net interest income would have 
undergone if average costs and returns, adjusted for the NPL ratio in the case of the latter, 
and the proportion of total assets represented by lending to ORSs, had remained constant. 
The effect therefore takes into account the changes deriving from the way the balance 
sheet total and its composition changed. The reason for singling out lending to ORSs is 
that this is the item with the highest interest yield of all deposit-taking institutions’ assets. 
Consequently, changes to it have a bigger impact on the profit and loss account than 
changes in total assets.
Finally, the margin effect is obtained by keeping the volume of assets and lending to ORSs 
constant, and letting their average returns –adjusted for NPLs– vary.
The breakdown of net interest income into the various effects can be seen in Chart 1.4, for 
the period since March 2003 (the earliest date for which the necessary information is 
available), and in Chart 1.5, for the period since December 2007 (when the NPL ratio 
began to rise as a result of the crisis). The series labelled “Remainder” comprises the 
unexplained part of the total change observed, resulting from the fact that the breakdown 
is a linear approximation. Chart 1.6 shows the observed net interest margin (income per 
unit of assets), adjusted for the NPL ratio and changes in the relative weight of lending.
As Chart 1.4 shows, in December 2016 (the most recent date for which data are available), 
the net interest income was at approximately the same level as in early 2003, in absolute 
terms (measured in euros). This is due to the fact that the negative effects of the shrinking 
of net interest margin, the NPL ratio and the remainder was somewhat more than 
compensated for by the strong growth in the volume of assets and lending between these 
two dates. Thus, at end-2016, despite the drop since the start of the crisis, the levels of 
total assets and lending were still around 97% and 82% higher than their levels at the 
1  Other resident sectors include households, non-financial corporations and financial corporations other than 
credit institutions resident in Spain.
2  The two series use slightly different concepts of lending and interest. The average return on lending includes all 
lending to ORSs and comprises both interest and fees registered as financial revenue. By contrast, the average 
rates on the outstanding amounts refer to lending in euros to households and non-financial corporations resident 
in the euro area and the narrowly defined effective rate (NDER, equivalent to APR without fees). Nevertheless, as 
can be seen in the chart, the differences are small and, apart from a slight difference in level due to the inclusion 
of fees in one case but not in the other, the time course of both series before the upturn in the NPL ratio during 
the recent crisis was very similar.
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start of 2003. It should also be noted that net interest margin (which, as explained, is 
measured here corrected for the impact of changes in the NPL ratio and the relative 
weight of lending) had begun to shrink before the start of the crisis. This effect has been 
fluctuating up and down since December 2007 (see Chart 1.5), but has not declined 
further, such that the total drop in net interest income (28%) taking place since then is 
basically explained by volume and NPL effects. Nevertheless, a narrowing of unit margins 
has been apparent since 2015, coinciding with the recent sharper drop in the short-term 
market interest rates (see Chart 1.6).3,4
Nevertheless, these findings should be interpreted with caution as the variations in the 
three effects mentioned are not independent from one another. Thus, for instance, a 
negative volume effect may be a result exogenous to institutions (through reduced demand 
for lending), but may also, in part, be a consequence of their own decisions on margins 
(tighter lending conditions in order to preserve these margins). The breakdown exercise 
presented does not make it possible to distinguish between the ultimate causes of these 
changes, but it does show that it would be inappropriate to concentrate solely on the 
impact of one of the components of net interest income rather than consider them all.
An alternative breakdown of net interest income is that based on the distinction between 
the two basic services the banking system traditionally provides: intermediation between 
savers and investors, and payment services.5 Banks charge some fees and commissions 
for these services, but obtain the bulk of their earnings from the spread between the 
returns on their assets and the cost of their liabilities. Thanks to their capital, diversification 
of credit and liquidity risks, and economies of scale, banks can offer their depositors 
financial instruments with a high degree of security and liquidity, while investing in riskier 
longer-term instruments. Deposit-taking institutions’ earnings from their intermediation 
activity derive from the higher yields on their lending than on their borrowing.  Moreover, 
the possibility of making payments using some of these bank liabilities makes them more 
attractive to savers than other equally liquid and safe instruments lacking this option, such 
that they are willing to accept a lower return. This lower return also contributes to deposit-
taking institutions’ net interest income.
Thus, net interest income can be broken down into the part deriving from payment services, 
and the part relating to intermediation activity. For this purpose, a reference interest rate 
for a safe and liquid asset that cannot be used directly to make payments is needed.
Chart 2.1 shows the historical trend in the interest rate on sight deposits and savings 
deposits from ORSs –taken as the part of banks’ liabilities that allow payments to be made 
and received– together with a reference interest rate, which is that of one-day government 
debt repurchase agreements. This type of transaction has risk and liquidity characteristics 
that are very similar to those of sight deposits, as they are very short term (one day) and 
very low risk (both as a result of the term and the government debt collateral). The basic 
difference is therefore that they do not allow payments. As can be seen, in the second half 
of the eighties, the interest on sight deposits was significantly below the reference market 
Payment services and 
financial intermediation 
3  Note that this does not necessarily imply that the low interest rate policy has had a net contractionary effect on 
the net interest income, as to evaluate this it would also be necessary to take into account what would have 
happened to the other components of the net income (assets, lending and NPLs) in the absence of this policy.
4  An alternative estimate of the effect of NPLs, in line with that applied in the breakdown of net interest income 
presented in the Banco de España’s Financial Stability report, would show this to have a less negative effect. 
Consequently, the current NPL-adjusted margin would be lower, although the drop would remain concentrated 
in the last two years (see Chart 2.21A of the May 2017 Financial Stability Report).
5  See, for example, Boyd (2008).
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rate, which implies that depositors were bearing a relatively high opportunity cost for 
keeping their funds in an instrument allowing them to make payments. This difference 
narrowed somewhat with increasing competitive pressure between deposit-taking 
institutions to attract deposits and savings accounts from the late 1980s onwards, although 
it remained significant and persisted until the sharp drop in policy interest rates began with 
the crisis in 2008.
Taking the interest rate on one-day repurchase agreements as the reference and 
considering sight deposits and savings deposits from ORSs as the sole banking liability 
providing payment services, an estimate can be obtained of the proportion of deposit-
taking institutions’ net interest income that remunerates banks for these payment services. 
Chart 2.2 shows the historical trend in this estimated amount (as a percentage of assets), 
together with total income received for payment services, including the estimated part of 
net interest income plus the fees and commissions for these services. Fees and 
commissions would therefore be the difference between these two series. The remainder 
of the net interest income would therefore represent payment for intermediation services.
First of all, it is worth noting the relative insignificance of the commissions for payment 
services. This is a reflection of Spanish financial institutions’ traditional policy of obtaining 
the bulk of their earnings from interest income, a strategy that was even intensified in the 
mid-2000s, and which has only been reversed somewhat in the past two years. Thus, 
these fees and commissions stood at around 0.3%-0.4% of total assets in the period from 
1987 to 2005, dropping to 0.13% in early 2015 and, although they have picked up 
somewhat in recent quarters, in December 2016 they still accounted for just 0.16%.
Secondly, Chart 2.2 shows how, more importantly, the bulk of the contraction in net interest 
margin (i.e. net intereset income per unit of assets) taking place over the last 25 years has 
been due to the reduction in the share of this income in the form of implicit charges levied 
for payment services. This represented 2.2% of deposit-taking institutions’ total assets in 
1990. It even turned slightly negative (-0.1%) in 2016. This component can be seen to 
follow the trend in short-term interest rates very closely.6 By contrast, the remainder of net 
SPANISH DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS' INCOME FROM PAYMENT SERVICES AND FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION
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interest income, which is earned on pure intermediation activity, dropped by 0.5 pp over 
this same period (from 1.6% to 1.1% of the balance sheet total).
The virtual disappearance of an important component of Spanish deposit-taking 
institutions’ income in 2009 (i.e. earnings from the implicit fees charged for current and 
savings account payment services), could lead institutions to raise their fees or widen the 
spreads applied on lending interest rates and other assets in order to preserve their 
margins. Nevertheless, recent data seem to suggest that there may be significant 
competitive pressure to avoid raising charges, at least in the short-term, given the lack of 
a tradition of charging for payment services in this way. Moreover, it has to be borne in 
mind that technological innovation is already having a potentially significant impact on 
the financial sector, and it is not yet possible to discern clearly how this will affect the 
banks’ competitive position with regard to the provision of this type of service. Additionally, 
the alternative of increasing the intermediation spread (i.e., the interest rate on lending 
minus the cost of borrowing not linked to payment services) may ultimately also have 
significant implications for this activity. 
The analysis in the preceding sections looked at margins on banks’ asset and liability 
portfolio as a whole. However, from the point of view of the possible effects on demand for 
banking services, it is worth analysing the margins applied to new business. This section 
analyses how these have progressed, focusing on loans and deposits in euros with euro 
area residents, for which interest rate data on new business since the start of 2003 are 
available.
In particular, based on the Monti-Klein model,7 frequently used for this type of analysis, it 
is possible to break down the net interest margin into an assets margin (average interest 
rates on assets less the cost of interbank funding) and a liabilities margin (the interbank 
rate less the average cost of liabilities). These margins depend on the elasticity of demand 
for loans and deposits, respectively.8  For example, Brunnermeier and Koby (2017) recently 
applied a version of this model to analyse the effects of reducing policy interest rates to 
negative levels, such as those currently set by the ECB’s deposit facility. The authors show 
how, theoretically, below a certain level (which will depend on the cost of substituting 
deposits by cash as a means of payment) it is not possible to further reduce interest on 
deposits, and the liabilities margin begins to contract. Given that, as a result of competition 
between institutions, the assets margin is optimally set as a function solely of the elasticity 
of demand for credit, this cannot compensate for the decline in the former, such that the 
total margin contracts as a result.
Chart 3 shows a breakdown of total net interest margin using this method for Spanish 
deposit-taking institutions. This breakdown suggests that, although since policy interest 
rates began to fall in 2008 the liability margin has effectively dropped to negative levels, 
the asset margin has not remained constant either. Thus, despite the drop registered in 
2015 and 2016 at the end of this two-year period it was still above pre-crisis values, 
Net interest income from 
new business: assets and 
liabilities margins
6  It is not affected by the slope of the market rate curve, as it is obtained by comparing two very short-term rates.
7  See Klein (1971) and Monti (1972). A brief explanation of the model can be found in Chapter 3 of Freixas and 
Rochet (2008), for example.
8  According to this model, banks have a certain amount of pricing power and set interest rates on loans and 
deposits according to the amount of demand they experience for each. The existence of an interbank market (or 
bond market) to which banks resort to borrow additional funds or invest their surplus liquidity, whose prices they 
are unable to influence (taken as a given), means that asset and liability interest rates can be separated. Each of 
them is set optimally as the interbank market return plus a spread (positive in the case of lending and negative 
in that of deposits), which depends on the elasticity of the corresponding demand function.
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compensating for much of the reduction in the liability margin.9 This may be partly the 
result of higher risk premia on lending interest rates. Nevertheless, another factor could be 
institutions seeking to preserve their income in a context of extremely low interest rates. To 
the extent that this is the case, it could be contributing to the greater relative attractiveness 
of market financing among agents of sufficient size to be able to obtain this form of 
financing.
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